



Rotman School of Management
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

**The David and Sharon
Johnston Centre for
Corporate Governance
Innovation**

**2019 Board Shareholder
Confidence Index**

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About the David & Sharon Johnston Centre for Corporate Governance Innovation

The David & Sharon Johnston Centre for Corporate Governance Innovation (Johnston Centre) is the University of Toronto, Rotman School of Management's home for research and resources about boards of directors and corporate governance. The Johnston Centre's purpose is to support academic research and teaching, generate practical tools & insights and host events that improve the effectiveness of boards of directors. We focus on under-served sectors such as family enterprise, both public and private, co-operatives, crown corporations and dual-class public issuers.

About the Board Shareholder Confidence Index

Since 2003, the **Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI)** has provided an annual examination of governance practices among Canadian Boards of Directors. While many variables can contribute to board effectiveness, including those best observed from inside the boardroom, we examine factors which shareholders look for when determining a board's ability to fulfill their duties. These criteria differ from the TSX Guidelines for effective corporate governance in their emphasis on the shareholder's perception of risk.

The BSCI evaluates and rates boards of directors on their potential to act effectively and by their performance as indicated through past practices. Criteria separated into three sections develop the final score, and the result is a transparent, objective, and adaptable rating system. The BSCI's three sections are: **Individual Potential**, which focuses on the directors themselves; **Group Potential**, which examines the board as a whole; and **Board Decision Output**, which analyzes a variety of board outputs.

BSCI Changes

For 16 years, the Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI) was produced and published by the The Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness (CCBE). Starting with the 2019 BSCI report, the Johnston Centre has taken over the production and publication of the index. The team that has overseen the BSCI over the last 9 years has remained the same as well. Matt Fullbrook (Matt.fullbrook@rotman.utoronto.ca) and Tony Spizzirri (aspizzirri@rotman.utoronto.ca) continue to manage the project.

The Johnston Centre evaluates the BSCI criteria on an annual basis to consider new items of governance importance to shareholders. We make changes through addition or subtraction of governance variables, but we also consider criteria weight distribution separately. We did not make any changes to the BSCI in 2019.

Individual Potential

The potential of individual directors to contribute a fully-independent point of view is an important element of effective governance. The **Individual Potential** section gauges how effectively positioned the individual directors are to represent shareholders' interests.

Director Independence measures the degree to which factors outside of the shareholder's interest can influence a director's decisions. In particular, the criteria in this section examine the potential influence of management, other directors, and other boards.

Board Independence

Independence from Management

In order for the board of directors to fully represent the shareholders' interests, individual directors must be able to act independently from the interests of management. Relationships with management increase the potential risk that a director will put executive interests before those of the shareholder.

We consider a director to be management-related if he/she meets any of the following criteria:

- the director is employed by the company being scored or by a company which is a subsidiary, parent, or sister company to the company being scored (currently or within the last three years);
- the director is an executive of any affiliated company;
- the director has, personally or through the director's firm, provided legal, auditing, or consulting services to the company (within the last 3 years);
- The director is the top manager/executive or owner of a company that provides services to the company.
- the director is kin to an employee;
- Any other relationship deemed material by the JOHNSTON CENTRE which does not fall under one of the above categories.

At least two-thirds of the board must be independent from management or else there is a deduction. The deduction increases as the proportion of related directors increases.

| % OF BOARD INDEPENDENT OF MANAGEMENT | DEDUCTION |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|
| < 50% | -10 |
| ≥ 50% AND < 60% | -7 |
| ≥ 60% AND < 66.7% | -4 |
| ≥ 66.7% | No deduction |

Director Interlocks

It is also important to keep the relationships between directors to a minimum. If two directors sit on more than one board together, this is a “Director Interlock.” A director Interlock results in a perceived risk of making decisions in the interest of another company. If, however, the CEO of the company being scored has an interlock with a fellow director who is the CEO of the interlocking board (i.e., both directors are CEOs and sit on each other’s company’s board), this is an “Executive Interlock.”

Deductions occur when more than one director interlock or at least one executive interlock is present on a board.¹

| # of Interlocks | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| > 1 DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS (OR 0 THREE-DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS) AND 0 EXECUTIVE INTERLOCKS | -3 |
| 1 OR 0 DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS (OR 0 THREE-DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS) AND ≥ 1 EXECUTIVE INTERLOCKS | -3 |
| 1 OR 0 DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS (OR 0 THREE-DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS) AND 0 EXECUTIVE INTERLOCKS | NO DEDUCTION |

Excessive Board Memberships

In order to perform effectively, a director must be able to dedicate as much of his or her time to the board as is necessary. As a result, a perceived risk emerges when a director appears to have too many obligations beyond her/his duties on the board. One of the most frequent ways in which this perceived risk manifests itself is when a director has an excessive number of other public company directorships outside that of the company.

As directors have lately been spending more time than ever on board work, we revised the number of directorships we deem to be excessive. A company receives a deduction if a director is a member of more than four S&P/TSX Composite Index boards as disclosed in the management information circulars.

| Directorships on public companies are excessive | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| At least 1 Director sits on > 4 Total | -3 |
| Otherwise | No Deduction |

¹ Previously, scoring in this section had only recognized interlocks between those companies listed on the S&P/TSX Composite Index. Since 2007, however, we broadened the scope to consider the Boards of all other publicly traded companies upon which Directors serve.

Director Attendance

Poor director attendance may suggest that a director is overcommitted and unable to dedicate sufficient time to board matters, or that a director is no longer making his/her role on the board a priority, thus resulting in a perceived risk.

There is a scoring deduction if a director failed to attend at least $\frac{3}{4}$ of board or individual committee meetings and there is no disclosed reasonable explanation for these absences. If, however, a director with poor attendance is not standing for re-election, then there is no deduction since the board has dealt with the problem. There is an automatic full deduction if there is not enough disclosure to determine director attendance.

| Meeting Attendance | Deduction |
|---|--|
| All directors attended at least 75% of all meetings | No Deduction |
| At least 1 director attended < 75% of meetings but is not being re-elected | No Deduction |
| At least 1 director attended <75% of meetings and is standing for re-election | -1 per director (max deduction of -5) |
| Not enough disclosure to determine if a director missed excessive meetings | -5 |

Director Share Ownership

A director, however independent and experienced, requires motivation to act in the best interest of shareholders. Although motivation is difficult to quantify, stock ownership considered to be an effective and demonstrable means of inciting motivation. As such, one measure of a director's motivation is to compare their stock ownership to their annual retainers.

The calculated value of a director's annual retainer is the sum of: (1) the stated annual cash retainer; (2) the grant date value of any share-based awards; and (3) the disclosed fair value of option grants. Fees excluded are those paid for committee membership, attendance and chair retainers.

When directors receive an annual retainer, a deduction is made when the stock ownership multiple is less than **three** times the calculated total director pay. Where there is no director retainer, a deduction occurs when a Director's stock ownership is **less than** \$30,000.

Directors receive a fixed an annual retainer:

| Ownership Multiple | Deduction |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 director owns less than 3x retainer | -2 per director (max deduction of 6) |
| Otherwise | No deduction |

Directors do not receive a fixed annual retainer:

| Average Share Ownership | Deduction |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 director owns less than \$30,000 | -2 per director (max deduction of 6) |
| Otherwise | No deduction |

GROUP POTENTIAL

In order for directors to effectively represent shareholder interests, the board must ensure that its structures and processes allow for clear and open discourse, and for the clear assessment and improvement of the board's collective skillset.

CEO/Chair Split

If one person is the CEO/Chair then there is a lower perceived potential for the board to operate independently from management than if the chair is a non-executive director. This lower perception persists even with a non-executive chair that is a non-independent director.

Companies receive a scoring deduction if there is no CEO/Chair split. This deduction is smaller if the board has appointed an Independent Lead Director. There is also a deduction if the Chair is not the CEO, but is nevertheless considered related to management through other means.

| CEO/Chair roles are split? | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| No split/no Lead Director | -10 |
| Roles Split / Chair is Related | -8 |
| No Split / Lead Director Appointed | -5 |
| Roles Split / Related Chair / Lead Director Appointed | -5 |
| Roles Split / Independent Chair | No Deduction |

Board Committee Independence

Audit, Compensation & Nominating Committees

Full independence of a board’s committees is necessary to ensure that the oversight of executive compensation, company accounting, and board nominations is handled without conflicts of interest between management and shareholders.

There is a scoring deduction if a director who is considered related to management is a member of the audit or compensation committees. Some input from management on the nominating committee can be of value without creating significant conflicts. Therefore, a scoring deduction only occurs if two or more related directors sit on the committee. An executive director related to management through their role as executives of a parent company will not trigger a deduction if they sit on the nomination or compensation committees. Parent companies are effectively major shareholders.

In the case of the audit and compensation Committees, additional relationships may render a director related to management exclusively within the context of these committees. If a director is either a non-management major shareholder (i.e., the director holds >30% of outstanding votes) or has a family relationship with a non-management major shareholder, she/he is considered related with respect to his/her membership on the audit and/or compensation committee, but not related with respect to the criteria outlined above under the Individual Potential section.

If an interlock exists between two CEOs on the compensation committees of each other’s companies, the involved directors are considered related with respect to these compensation committees. This is to discourage situations where CEOs from different companies are determining each other’s salaries.

Each committee receives a separate score so the total deduction can be -12.

| Board Committee Independence | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| AUDIT COMMITTEE: Related Director(s) OR 1 director with a CEO interlock on the Committee. | -4 |
| COMPENSATION COMMITTEE: Related Director(s) or 1 director with a CEO interlock on the Committee. | -4 |
| NOMINATING COMMITTEE: At least two Related Directors on the Committee | -4 |
| Otherwise (per committee) | No Deduction |

Share Structure

Many companies have more than one class of share (e.g., Class A, Class B, etc.), and in some cases the different classes do not have equal voting rights.

EXAMPLE:

| Class | Votes per Share | Shares Outstanding |
|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Class A Voting | 1 | 10,000 |
| Class B Non-Voting | 0 | 5,000,000 |

In this case, the entirety of the company's voting rights are associated with a small minority of the outstanding shares. An imbalance of voting rights such as this decreases shareholder influence on board decisions, which in turn decreases the incentive for directors to represent the interests of all shareholders. Deductions in this area are graduated. As the disproportion between shares and voting rights increases, so too does the deduction.

| Share Structure | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| <20% of Equity Controls >80% of Votes | -10 |
| <40% or Less Equity Controls >60% or Votes | -7 |
| <50% of Equity controls >50% of Votes | -4 |
| >50% of Equity controls >50% of Votes | No Deduction |
| No Dual Class or Subordinated Share Structure | No Deduction |

Meetings without Management Policy

Do the independent members of the board hold in camera sessions at every board meeting, including ad-hoc and special board meetings? One of the board's primary responsibilities is to hire the CEO and evaluate their performance. It is therefore important for the board to meet without the CEO or management to discuss items that are a matter of employment, compensation or performance.

| Board meetings without management policy | Deduction |
|---|---------------------|
| The Board does not meet without management at every meeting. | -6 |
| The Board meets without management at every meeting. | No Deduction |

Director Assessments

Full Board & Individual Assessments

Formal and regular evaluation processes allow directors to assess and improve the performance of the board while identifying possible trouble spots. The BSCI monitors both individual director evaluations, in which directors use self-assessments or peer reviews to determine their own competencies and areas for improvement, and full-board evaluations, in which the directors evaluate their performance as a cohesive unit. When undertaken effectively and regularly, these separate but related systems provide shareholders with an assurance of the board's commitment to ongoing improvement.

In order to receive a perfect score in this category, a company must implement and disclose regular and formal evaluation processes for the board as a whole and for each of its individual Directors. Points are deducted if the board discloses an evaluation system, but without process details. A company receives separate scores for full-board and individual director evaluations.

| Evaluation Processes | Deduction |
|--|---------------------|
| No Full-Board Evaluation | -5 |
| No Individual Director Evaluation | -5 |
| Otherwise | No Deduction |

Board Skills Matrix

The annual Management Information Circular is the primary resource for educating shareholders regarding the directors standing for election. As such, the inclusion of a skills matrix in the circular helps illustrate to shareholders how the abilities of the board as a whole meet the needs of the organization while also highlighting the specific skills that individual directors bring to the boardroom. Use of a skills matrix also provides a framework through which Boards and Shareholders can identify gaps and redundancies in board composition.

Ideally, a skills matrix will disclose two sets of information: first, the skills individual directors standing for nomination possess; and second, the skills the board has determined it requires and how many directors possess these skills. That said, disclosure of the skills of the board as a whole are more valuable than the disclosure of individual skills, as this information provides shareholders with the most concise understanding of the board's strengths and weaknesses.

If the company discloses the board required skills without detailing individual director skills then there is a small score deduction. If the inverse is true then there is a larger deduction. We deduct the maximum if no skills matrices are present.

| Skills Matrix | Deduction |
|--|---------------------|
| Disclosure of board skills but no director skills | -1 |
| Disclosure of director skills but no board skills | -2 |
| No disclosure of board or director skills | -3 |
| Full Disclosure of director and board skills | No Deduction |

Continuing Education & Orientation

By providing formal continuing education opportunities to directors, boards can ensure that their directors have effective skills and knowledge in areas relevant to the board's role. Such opportunities may include training manuals, site visits, courses and retreats, or other creative and unique approaches, as long as the program is formal and regular. When disclosing their continuing education programs, however, boards can foster further shareholder confidence by disclosing the specific educational activities conducted in the past year, thereby enabling shareholders to gain a better understanding of which competencies the board is attempting to emphasize and improve. For full disclosure credit, the board can also disclose which directors attended these activities.

Director orientation is another important educational component, ensuring that new directors effectively overcome any learning curves and acquaint themselves with the core knowledge required of their role. As with ongoing continuing education programs, the exact form of the orientation is for the board to decide, but in order to inspire shareholder confidence the program must be formal and repeatable.

To receive full marks, companies must disclose a formal continuing education process, the specific educational activities conducted in the most recent year, the attendees for each activity, and a formal orientation process.

| Director Education & Orientation | Deduction |
|--|---------------------|
| Does not disclose this year's continuing education | -1 |
| Does not disclose formal process for Director Orientation | -1 |
| Does not disclose Continuing Education Process | -1 |
| Full disclosure of continuing education including this year's activities and director orientation process | No Deduction |

Board Retirement Policies

A board retirement policy can ensure that board renewal occurs regularly and at a healthy rate. Term limit and retirement age policies are useful renewal mechanisms that can have a positive impact on board effectiveness. This can happen through additional assessments of long-tenured directors and by catalyzing conversations with directors about leaving the board. It's up to the board to choose the retirement policy that works for them.

To receive full marks the company must disclose that either a term or an age limit policy is in place.

| Board Retirement Policies | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| Does not disclose or has not adopted a term limit or a retirement age policy | -4 |
| A term limit or Retirement Age policy is in place. | No Deduction |

Board Gender Diversity Policy

Boards of directors can improve decision effectiveness by improving the diversity at the table. Board diversity can manage the risk of the board falling into poor decision-making traps like groupthink. One way to improve board diversity is to improve gender diversity as men continue to represent about 80% of the TSX Index seats.

A company will receive credit for disclosing details of a board diversity policy if the details include specific features relating to improving the representation of women on the board.

For full disclosure credit, the board must have a board gender diversity policy, a gender target and a timeline in place for meeting the target. There is a **3 point** deduction if the board gender diversity policy does not include a gender target, or there is a target with no disclosed timeline. There is also a **5 point** deduction if there is no board gender diversity policy in place or disclosed.

Note: Companies that have a target and have already met it do not have to have a timeline for achieving their target. Also, companies with gender parity on their board will receive no deduction even if they have not adopted a formal target.

| Board Gender Diversity | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| No board gender diversity policy details disclosed | -5 |
| Company has a gender diversity policy, but no target or has a target without a timeline to achieve the target. | -3 |
| Company has a diversity policy, gender target and a timeline | No Deduction |

BOARD DECISION OUTPUT

Directors are required to make numerous decisions which directly affect shareholder confidence in the company and in the board. The BSCI covers decisions that can influence option dilution; pay-for-performance policies; pay risk management policies; change of control provisions; CEO share ownership; decisions which affect director elections and finally, executive succession planning.

Option Plan

Dilution

The granting of options dilutes returns that would otherwise go to shareholders. A small amount of dilution is often unavoidable, but there is a score deduction if options issued and outstanding represent more than 5% of a company's outstanding shares, and a larger deduction if dilution exceeds 10% of outstanding shares.

| Dilution % | Deduction |
|---------------|--------------|
| ≥ 8% | -5 |
| ≥ 5% and < 8% | -2 |
| <5% | No Deduction |

Option Re-Pricing

When a company's share performance has suffered, the cost of exercising stock options can be greater than the cost of purchasing stock at market value. In such a case, a company may decide to lower the exercise price in order to align it with the market value of the stock. The perception of option re-pricing, however, is that the board is relieving directors and executives of their responsibility for the company's performance.

There is a deduction if a company has re-priced their options within the last three years.

| Re-pricing | Deduction |
|----------------------------------|--------------|
| Options Re-priced Within 3 Years | -5 |
| Otherwise | No deduction |

Option Gains Disclosed

While boards are now required to disclose a grant date fair-value for options awarded to executives during the most recent fiscal year, they are not required to disclose the value of option gains for the year. Disclosure of option gains provides shareholders with a clearer impression of CEO compensation outcomes over time. If there is no disclosure of option gains then there is a scoring deduction.

| Option Gains Disclosed | Deduction |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| No disclosure of option gains | -3 |
| Option gains disclosed | No deduction |

Options to Directors

The granting of options to directors is becoming less common. However, many companies continue this dilutive practice. There is a deduction will be made if directors are eligible to receive options and/or have received them within the past 3 years.

| Options to Directors | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| Directors are not eligible for options or have not received options in the past 3 years | No deduction |
| Otherwise | -2 |

Evergreen Option Plan

Generally, shareholders must approve the replenishment of issuable options of a company's option plan once the plan reaches the previously approved maximum allowed. That said, some companies use Evergreen Option Plans, through which the maximum number of options approved for issue stands as a percentage of outstanding shares rather than a specific number. These plans allow companies to continue granting options in any amount up to a certain percentage dilution. Evergreen plans limit shareholder input into option plans, while increasing the possibility of higher dilution.

There is a **2 point** deduction if the Company has an Evergreen Option Plan in place regardless of limit.

| Evergreen Option Plan | Deduction |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| Company has Evergreen Option Plan | -2 |
| Otherwise | No deduction |

Option Vesting Policy

Vesting periods provide option holders with a longer-term interest in the company's performance, thus aligning their interest with shareholders'. Early option vesting goes against the intended long-term growth incentive of the option grant. Therefore, an option vesting policy should not permit options to vest prior to the first anniversary of the grant. Further, 100% of the option grant should not vest prior to the third anniversary of the grant date as this promotes the consideration of a longer-term growth strategy for the company.

No deduction if options vest no earlier than the first anniversary of the grant and at least some vest on or after the third anniversary. There is a **1 point** deduction if there is a minimum vesting period of one year and all options vest prior to the third anniversary. There is a maximum deduction if any options vest prior to the first anniversary regardless of full vesting term length.

| Option Vesting Policy | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| At least some options vest prior to the first anniversary of the grant. | -2 |
| No options vest prior to the first anniversary and all options vested prior to the third anniversary. | -1 |
| Otherwise | No deduction |

Change of Control Provisions

Double Trigger Change of Control Provision on Option Vesting

Change of control provisions will often promise immediate vesting of all equity awards in order to protect the CEO from losing their unvested equity after a transaction takes place. Change of control can be defined as either: a) a defined reorganization; b) >50% change on the board of directors or; c) a merger or acquisition. Therefore, it is possible that the CEO's employment can continue after a change of control, but the equity immediately vests anyway. A double trigger change of control provision relies on two events to occur: 1) A change of control and; 2) the termination of the CEO's employment (without cause or voluntary termination for disclosed 'good reasons'). In this case the change of control provision does not protect the CEO unless there is a termination of employment.

There is a deduction if the change of control provisions are single trigger. There is no deduction if the company does not have change of control provisions. There is no deduction if the company has double trigger change of control provisions. However, there will be a deduction if one of the two triggers is a voluntary termination by the CEO for 'good reason' without defining 'good reason' in the management information circular. If the double trigger provision is only in place for less than a year then there is a deduction.

| Change of Control Provision on Option Vesting | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| CEO must be terminated from Company upon a Change of Control | No Deduction |
| Otherwise | -3 |

Double Trigger Change of Control Provision on Cash Benefits

Change of control provisions often promise a financial settlement in terms of salary and benefits in order to protect the CEO from unemployment hardships upon a change of control. However, the CEO can receive a financial settlement outlined in a single trigger change of control provision without losing their job. A double trigger change of control provision ensures that CEOs only receive a settlement if they lose their job.

There is a deduction if the change of control provisions are single trigger. There is no deduction if the company does not have change of control provisions. There is no deduction if the company has double trigger change of control provisions. However, there will be deductions if one of the two triggers is a voluntary termination by the CEO for 'good reason' without defining 'good reason' in the management information circular. There is a deduction if the double trigger provision is only in place for less than a year.

| Change of Control Provision on Cash Benefits | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| CEO must be terminated from Company upon a Change of Control | No Deduction |
| Otherwise | -3 |

Performance Peer Group

Relative corporate performance metrics for CEO incentive compensation help to ensure that the CEO is accountable for corporate performance in both absolute and relative terms. Relative metrics provide the CEO with the motivation to increase performance relative to the corporation's peers. Therefore, it is important that the board meaningfully chooses the constituents of the performance peer group and discloses them to shareholders.

There is a deduction for not providing a list of the peer group constituents and if the selection rationale disclosure. If the company uses a specific industry or an indexed listing of stocks and discloses the name of the index, then that is sufficient to receive no deductions for both criteria.

Performance Peer Group Constituents

| Performance Group Constituents | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| Company discloses the constituents of the Peer Group used for Relative Performance Metrics | No deduction |
| Otherwise | -3 |

Performance Peer Group Selection Rationale

| Performance Group Selection Rationale | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| Company discloses the rationale used to create the Peer Group used for Relative Performance Metrics | No Deduction |
| Otherwise | -3 |

CEO Compensation

CEO Pay Is Related To Performance

It is the responsibility of the board of directors to determine CEO compensation. In order to best represent the interests of a company's shareholders, such compensation should be associated with the company's performance. There are scoring deductions if there is no explicit link between the company's financial performance and the determination of the CEO's bonus.

| CEO Bonus and Corporate Performance Linkage | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| CEO Bonus metrics are linked to corporate financial performance and all metrics are disclosed. | No Deduction |
| CEO Bonus metrics are linked to financial performance. | -4 |
| Otherwise | -7 |

Annual Bonus Awarded Even If Targets Missed?

It is the responsibility of the board of directors to determine CEO compensation. Linking CEO compensation to company performance is important to best represent the interests of a company's shareholders. Therefore, if the company's performance is poor, the size of the CEO's bonus, if any, should be reflective of the poor performance. We are looking for disclosure that explicitly states that there can be no bonus payout for the CEO under poor performance conditions. There is a deduction if it is not clear that it is possible for there to be no bonus payout.

| Minimum CEO Bonus Possible | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| the ceo compensation plan shows that there is no payout when the ceo misses targets. | No deduction |
| Otherwise | -3 |

Performance Hurdles on CEO Equity Compensation

Boards use equity compensation to align the interests of management and shareholders. Traditional equity compensation vests based on the passage of time in order to help retain the CEO. The inclusion of financial performance requirements for the vesting of equity provides further meaningful alignment between the interests of the CEO and those of shareholders.

There is a maximum **two point deduction**. If the CEO participates in a restricted share plan and no portion of the restricted share awards vest based on company performance then there is a deduction. There is a second deduction if the CEO received an option grant during the fiscal year and no portion of the grant is subject to performance vesting.

| Equity Performance Hurdles | Deduction |
|---|---------------|
| Option grants are time vesting only. | -1 |
| Restricted Share Unit grants are time vesting only. | -1 |
| Otherwise | No Deductions |

Formal Clawback (Recoupment) Policy

Boards must be proactive at managing and mitigating excessive short-term risk-taking by executive officers. A clawback policy enables the board to recoup executive bonuses in the event of a restatement of the company's financial results due to fraud or gross misconduct. A more robust clawback policy includes a provision for the board to recoup compensation for other reasons than a financial restatement affected by the executive's risky or fraudulent actions. We refer to the provision allowing the board to clawback pay without a financial restatement as a "board discretion" provision.

No deduction if the company has a clawback policy with a board discretion provision. A **3 point** deduction if the company does not have a clawback policy. A **2 point** deduction for a clawback policy without a board discretion provision.

| Clawback Policy | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| Company has implemented a formal clawback policy including provisions to clawback without restatement. | No deduction |
| Company has implemented a formal clawback policy | -2 |
| Otherwise | -3 |

CEO Share Ownership Requirements

CEO Share Ownership Guideline

A CEO requires motivation to act in the best interest of shareholders. Although motivation is difficult to quantify, a generally accepted practice of requiring stock ownership is an effective and demonstrable means of aligning management and shareholder interests. A share ownership guideline requires the CEO to own and maintain a significant amount of stock throughout their term of employment. Three times salary is a generally accepted level of required stock ownership for the CEO.

There is a deduction if the CEO share ownership guideline is less than three times disclosed salary.

| CEO share ownership guideline | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| No CEO Share Ownership Guideline OR CEO Share Ownership Guideline is < 3 times Salary | No Deduction |
| CEO Share Ownership Guideline is \geq 3 times Salary | -2 |

CEO Retirement Share Holding Period

It is the board's responsibility to ensure the smooth and effective succession of the CEO. One way to ensure that the outgoing CEO continues to make good long-term decisions is to require the CEO to continue to hold a relatively significant amount of accumulated equity into retirement. There is a scoring deduction if there is no requirement for the CEO to hold equity for at least 1 year into retirement.

| CEO post-retirement holding period policy | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| CEO is required to hold equity for at least 1 year post-retirement | No deduction |
| Otherwise | -3 |

CEO Succession Planning

One of the board's most important responsibilities is ensuring that a proper succession plan is in place in the event of the voluntary or involuntary departure of the CEO. There is a significant risk when a board does not have a formal and reliable succession plan for the CEO and the cost of hiring externally can often be significant. Disclosure of a formal succession plan for the CEO in the information circular reassures shareholders that the board considers these risks.

There is a deduction if there is no disclosure of a formal succession planning process.

| Succession Plan Disclosure | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| Formal Succession Plan process disclosed | No deduction |
| Otherwise | -3 |

Director Elections

Detailed Voting Results

Many boards provide shareholders with a detailed report of voting results for all resolutions listed in the Form of Proxy. This ensures transparency and communication with shareholders. There is a scoring deduction if there is no sufficient disclosure on voting resolutions other than the director election and auditor resolutions, indicating the percentage/number of votes for/against/withheld.

| Detailed Voting Results other than director elections | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| Detailed voting results for all other voting matters on form of proxy | No deduction |
| Not enough disclosure for all voting results | -2 |

Director Election Results from Previous Year

In recent years companies have begun to disclose previous year's election results for each director in the management information circular. This practice increases transparency and communication with shareholders as they can more easily review voting information alongside director biographies for current voting decisions. There is a deduction if there is no disclosure of the director election results from the previous AGM in the management information circular.

| Previous Director Election Results Disclosed in Proxy | Deduction |
|--|--------------|
| Disclosure of Previous Year Election Results in Management Circular. | No deduction |
| Otherwise | -2 |

Say-On-Pay

Shareholders want to have a say on how the CEO is paid. While companies listed on American stock exchanges are required to have a Say-on-Pay policy, Canadian-listed companies are not. We not only look for the adoption of Say-on-Pay, but also for clear communication in cases where shareholders show low shareholder confidence in pay. If the company received less than 70 per cent support on its say-on-pay vote in the prior year, does it clearly explain in its proxy circular what changes it has made to its compensation plan as a result?

There is no deduction if there is a Say-on-Pay policy in place and, if applicable the company responds in the proxy to the previous year's sub-70% Say-on-Pay vote. There is a **2 point** deduction if the company does not provide their shareholders with a say on pay. As well, there is a **2 point** deduction if a company does have a Say-on-Pay policy, but does not respond to a sub-70% voting approval in the prior year's Say-on-Pay vote.

| Say on Pay policy and results disclosed in proxy | Deduction |
|---|--------------|
| Say-on-Pay policy in place and company responds to sub-70% shareholder approval, if applicable. | No deduction |
| Otherwise | -2 |